Philosophical projects

Does phenomenology support the axiomatic framework of integrated information theory (IIT)

Publication status: (in preparation)

In this paper, we first review how IIT’s axiomatic framework has evolved through the latest version (4.0), and why the theory takes such an approach. We then analyze this approach through the lens of Husserlian phenomenology, finding support for both IIT’s axiomatic approach in general, and for all of IIT’s individual axioms.

Posters: Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness 28, Heraklion, Crete (July 6th – 9th, 2025) (upcoming)

Integrated information theory (IIT) and the testability of the silent neuron predictions

Publication status: (submitted) at Neuroscience of Consciousness

In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of IIT’s two silent neuron predictions, showing how they can in fact be tested, contra Bartlett (2022). In the final section of the paper, we also distinguish between two ways of explaining one of the predictions. By drawing on the work of Imre Lakatos, we conclude with a discussion of how the distinction between the two explanations sheds light on why it is so difficult to resolve theoretical disputes about consciousness. Despite these difficulties, we provide a framework that can lead to concrete progress.

Talks: Monash University School of Psychological Sciences (MoNoC/Tsuchiya Lab), Zoom (May 16th, 2023) (*invited)

Posters: Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness 27, Tokyo, Japan (July 2nd - 5th, 2024)